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Note
Perception is not Reality: The FCPA, Brazil, and
the Mismeasurement of Corruption*
Stuart Vincent Campbell**
Just as a fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either
as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed
in the government work cannot be found out while taking money for
themselves. It is possible to mark the movements of birds flying high
up in the sky; but not so is it possible to ascertain the movement of
government servants of hidden purpose. – The Art of Politics:
Kautilya1

I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of corruption can be traced back to the far
reaches of human history,2 and has probably existed as long as
government itself. Ancient philosophers such as Aristotle and
Cicero discussed the problem of self–interest in the civil
service.3 An example of an early attempt by human society to
regulate corruption through law is a medieval English rule
promulgated in 1346 which prohibited judges from accepting
items of value, except for small quantities of meat or drink, in
order to prevent bribery.4 As much as law has attempted to
*
The Minnesota Journal of International Law has relied on the author
for the accuracy of the Portuguese source materials.
**
J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. As an
undergraduate, the author studied abroad at Pontificia Universidade Católica
in São Paulo, Brazil, and speaks fluent Spanish and Portuguese. The author
would like to thank his former high school debate coaches Dave McGinnis,
Rick Brundage, and Arthur Latz–Hall – without whom he would have never
developed the research skills essential to write this article.
1. DONALD MACKENZIE BROWN, THE WHITE UMBRELLA: INDIAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM MANU TO GANDHI 58 (1964).
2. Shang–Jun Wei, Local Corruption and the Global Economy, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH REPORTER, Spring 2000, at 15, available at
http://nber.org/reporter/spring00/wei.html (comparing the ubiquity of
corruption in human history to that of cockroaches).
3. SEPPO TIIHONEN, THE HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT 8–9 (2003).
4. Id.
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stamp out corruption, scholars accept that it persisted on a
wide scale in the United States until the early 20th Century.5
In 1977, the United States took the historic step of banning its
businesspeople from engaging in bribery overseas by passing
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).6 However,
enforcement was minimal for decades after FCPA passage. This
was in part due to fear over the possible consequences of
implementing it7 in a world where many major U.S. trading
partners still offered tax write–offs for bribes their companies
gave to foreign officials.8 More recently, international treaties
have normalized the fight against business corruption.9 The
past ten years have seen a massive increase in FCPA
enforcement.10 Indeed, the early 21st Century was the first
time in human history that international business people had
been meaningfully threatened with legal sanction in their
home–countries for promoting their companies’ interests
overseas through corruption and bribery.
The United States’ historic effort at regulating such
corruption could be considered ethically laudable,11 but these
5. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2007: CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 106 (2007) (referring to increased use
of media as a tool to combat corruption in the United States). In this author’s
opinion, the case could be made that corruption had a substantial effect on
United States political history well into the mid and late 20th Century. See,
e.g., ROBERT CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON
(2002) (documenting Lyndon Johnson’s tenure in the Senate and arguing that
his ability to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1957 derived substantially from his
skillful use of illegal campaign contributions, corporate slush funds, and
intimidation); FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (1995).
6. See The International Anti–Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998:
Hearing on H.R. 4353 Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous
Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (testimony of Paul
V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm.), available at 1998 WL 642491 (S.E.C.), for rationale behind the Act.
7. Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 448–
49 (2010).
8. FRANCIS CHERUNILAM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: TEXT AND CASES
653 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that France and Germany give tax write–offs for
bribes given to foreign officials to secure business overseas).
9. DR. FRÉDÉRIC WEHRLÉ, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO–OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD CORRUPTION: OECD
COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCE IN COMBATING BRIBERY AND PROMOTING TRADE AND
INVESTMENT
WORLD–WIDE
2–3
(2005),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/34448578.pdf.
10. Thomas, supra note 7, at 449–50.
11. The United States has been called a “Boy Scout” for its ethically high–
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fledgling attempts have implicated the same issue identified by
Kautiliya in 4th Century B.C. India: The difficulty, or indeed
impossibility, of detecting and accurately measuring
corruption.12 Researchers, most notably those working for the
anti–corruption non–profit Transparency International, have
attempted to measure corruption by using the perception of
corruption as a proxy for its actual occurrence.13 Though
corruption perception is the most widely used and popular
means of measuring corruption,14 critics like Brazilian
corruption researcher Claudio Weber Abramo have questioned
the construct validity of measuring a country’s level of
corruption by measuring the level of perceived corruption
attributed to it — arguing that the perception proxy “has more
than run its course.”15 This paper argues that the legal
profession’s reliance on a flawed indicator of corruption
implicates a literature critical of the economic effects of the
FCPA and aims to strengthen the position taken by academics
who favor the addition of a “compliance defense” to the FCPA.16
Though the problems discussed in this note are pervasive in
present efforts to regulate international corruption, this note is
built on the illustrative example of Brazil, which, unlike
similarly situated countries such as China,17 India,18 and
minded attempt to prevent overseas bribery because of the potentially
crippling effects this could have on American businesses. See, e.g., Patrick
Glynn et al., Inst. for Int’l Econ., The Globalization of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 17 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed.,
1997).
12. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 58.
13. For discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.
14. Id.
15. Murk Meter: The best–known corruption index may have run its
course, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30th–Nov. 5th 2010, at 66, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/17363752.
16. See infra Part II.2, for a discussion of the corporate compliance
defense in the U.K. Bribery Act.
17. See Bruce M. Boyd, Governmental Corruption in China: Application of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 235, 235 (2004)
(“[Chinese corruption] is especially problematic for companies from the United
States which are prohibited from bribing governmental officials to obtain or
retain business by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’).”); Nicole Y.
Hines, Cultural Due Diligence: The Lost Diligence That Must Be Found By
U.S. Corporations Conducting M&A Deals in China to Prevent Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 19, 22 (2007) (“Certain
aspects of Chinese culture, especially quanxi . . . and mianzi . . . pose a high
degree of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . . . .”); Hilary K.
Josephs, The Uprights and the Low–Down: An Examination of Official
Corruption in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 27
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Russia,19 has not been the subject of FCPA compliance research
published by law journals.20 The example of Brazil is
SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 269, 298 (2000) (describing the different cultural
understandings of what is violative gift–giving under Chinese law and the
FCPA); Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing
Business in China, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 397, 397–98 (2007) (examining the
intricacies of FCPA compliance for American businesses seeking to do
business in China); Judith A. Lee & James D. Slear, Unique Problems with
FCPA Compliance in the People’s Republic of China, BUS. L. TODAY 15,
May/June 2007, at 15 (“Common sense, therefore, dictates that PRC business
plans incorporate controls to ensure that the U.S. companies and issuers and
third parties working on their behalf be in compliance with the FCPA from the
outset . . . .”); Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its
Application to U.S. Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 14
(2008) (“Given the fact that corruption in China is widespread, and the
government still owns and manages the country’s largest companies,
compliance with the [FCPA] can be exceptionally challenging for U.S.
corporations that conduct business operations in China.”); F. Joseph Warin et.
al., FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 33, 35 (2010) (addressing the legal risks of Chinese gift and
hospitality culture and presenting suggestions for structuring compliance
programs); Delia Poon, Note, Exposure to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Guide for U.S. Companies With Activities in the People’s Republic of China to
Minimize Liability, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 345 (1996)
(proffering FCPA compliance measures for U.S. businesses in their dealings
with China).
18. See Beverly Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti–Corruption Efforts Paying
Off? International and National Measures in the Asia–Pacific Region and their
Impact on India and Multinational Corporations, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 78–
84 (2008) (reviewing effects of the Asian Development Bank on business in
India); Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 389, 389 (1998) (“India’s current anti–corruption laws are
ineffective; hence, U.S. corporations find it increasingly difficult to follow the
requirements of the [FCPA] while doing business in India, ‘one of the most
corrupt countries in the world.’”).
19. See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia:
Implications for U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1999,
1999 (1996) (warning U.S. businesses of the risks under both Russian and
United States law of bribing Russian government officials, and warning the
U.S. Government that such bribery undermines the transformation to
democracy in Russia); Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA
in Russia and other Former Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 378, 378
(1997) (noting the challenge of competing effectively in Russia and complying
with the FCPA); William Spiegelberger, Russian Roulette: Doing Business in
Russia in Compliance with Anti–Bribery Laws and Treaties, 2 N.Y.U. J. L &
BUS. 819, 821 (2006) (“[C]ombination of a treacherous business environment
and often murky ownership structures presents a considerable problem for
foreign companies that want to do business in Russia in compliance with their
domestic legislation criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.”).
20. The most detailed existing research of FCPA compliance in Brazil
treats Latin America generally and contains only two textual references to
Brazil, thus doing little more than listing it as a country in the region. See
Veronica Foley & Catina Haynes, The FCPA and its Impact in Latin America,
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particularly useful for demonstrating the weakness of
statistical measures of corruption because “Brazil is not easily
grasped by the eagle’s eye”;21 that is, Brazil is particularly
difficult to comprehend through use of the grand
generalizations that underlie the most popular statistical
measures for corruption.
Critics of the economic effects of the FCPA have argued
that the law functions as a sanction on developing countries,
because it creates disincentives to invest in economies that are
perceived to carry high corruption risk — most frequently
developing countries in need of development capital.22 The
thesis of this note is that lawyers’ reliance on the highly flawed
proxy of corruption perception may contribute to the economic
distortion created by the FCPA — deterring investment in
important developing economies such as Brazil. Part II briefly
examines the most important legislation regulating American
businesspeople in Brazil. Part III compares different types of
statistics purporting to measure corruption in Brazil,
demonstrating the wide divide between different corruption
measures. Part IV investigates the corruption perception
statistics commonly used by the legal community to measure
FCPA compliance risk, and whether the FCPA deters American
businesses from investing in developing economies. This section
of the note also argues that criticisms of corruption perception
statistics strengthen a broader literature, and argues for a
compliance defense in the FCPA. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND ON ANTI–CORRUPTION
LEGISLATION RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN BRAZIL
There are three sets of laws likely to be relevant to
American businesses investing in Brazil: those of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil itself. The FCPA and
the Travel Act have both been used by the United States to
punish international bribery.23 The United Kingdom’s 2010
17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 27, 27 & 40 (2009).
21. Cláudio Weber Abramo, Introduction to TRANSPARÊNCIA BRASIL,
REPORT ON BRAZIL: PRESENTED TO THE GLOBAL FORUM II ON FIGHTING
CORRUPTION
(2001),
available
at
http://www.transparencia.org.br/docs/GFIIReport.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti–Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against
Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010).
23. See infra notes 34, 52 and 62 and accompanying text.
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Bribery Act is also relevant to many American businesses
because of its far–reaching jurisdictional provisions.24 Finally,
American businesses need to consider Brazilian law — both
because host country law influences the application of the
FCPA,25 and also because it has been used to prosecute
international businesspeople who have attempted to bribe
Brazilian officials.26
1. U.S. LAWS REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
CORRUPTION
In 2009, a man who represented himself as an agent of the
Minister of Defense of Gabon approached sales representatives
for various weapons manufacturers to offer them the
opportunity to outfit his country’s elite presidential guard.27 In
order for the transaction to go forward, he asked for a 20%
commission that he claimed was legal.28 In reality, the man’s
purported business proposal was concocted by the FBI to
ensnare American business executives in an FCPA
investigation.29 This aggressive and proactive enforcement
exemplifies the unprecedented vigor that characterizes current
United States anti–corruption investigation. Most international
anti–corruption prosecutions pursued by the United States are
brought under the FCPA, which only bans public sector
bribery. However, American businesses also need to consider
the Travel Act, which has been interpreted to allow
prosecutions for private sector bribery as well.30
24. See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 47 (using Germany’s aggressive enforcement in
corruption matters as example of need to coordinate with other nations to
account for their interests and sovereignty).
26. See, e.g., Hariri Probe Seeks Lebanese Banker Arrested for Bribery in
Brazil,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Mar.
14,
2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187765,00.html (discussing a case where
a bank executive was arrested for attempting to give Brazilian police a
$200,000 bribe).
27. Jeremy Pelofsky, Mistrial in U.S. Bribery Sting After Jury Deadlock,
REUTERS, Jul. 7, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-briberyverdict-idUSTRE7667R320110707.
28. Christopher Norton, Gabon FCPA Informant Says He Claimed Deal
Was Legal, LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/283302.
29. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
TWENTY–TWO EXECUTIVES AND EMPLOYEES OF MILITARY AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT PRODUCTS COMPANIES CHARGED IN FOREIGN BRIBERY SCHEME
(Jan. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm048.html [hereinafter TWENTY–TWO EXECUTIVES].
30. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
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The FCPA was passed in 1977 as a reaction to public
outrage prompted by high profile cases of corporate
corruption31 and amended three times thereafter in 1988, 1994,
and 1998.32 The FCPA contains provisions that prohibit foreign
bribery, which are enforced by the Department of Justice
(DOJ), as well as requirements that companies engage in
accounting practices to deter corruption, which are enforced by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).33 Violations of
both the FCPA accounting34 and bribery35 provisions can lead
to heavy fines for business–violators, and bribery violations by
individuals can lead to time in prison.36
FCPA bribery provisions make it a crime to:
(1) “willfully”; (2) “make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce,” (3) “corruptly;” (4) “in furtherance of
an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any more, or
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value to;” (5) “any
foreign official;” (6) “for purposes of [either]
influencing any act or decision of such foreign
official in his official capacity [or] inducing such
foreign official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official [or]
securing any improper advantage,” (7) “in order
to assist such [corporation] in obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person.”37
The FCPA’s accounting provisions require companies that
issue securities to “make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
31. S. REP. NO. 95–114, at 3 (1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95–640, at 5–6 (1977).
32. The content of these amendments falls outside the scope of this
research, which focuses on the present–day compliance challenges faced by
American companies.
33. Thomas, supra note 7, at 439–44.
34. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (2002)
(originally enacted as Act of 1977); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (2012) (originally
enacted as Act of 1977).
35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–2 (1998); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–3(e) (1998); 15
U.S.C.A. § 78ff(c) (2002).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§78dd–2(g)(2)(A) (2000).
37. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing 15
U.S.C §§78dd–2, 78ff (2000)).
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reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
[i]ssuer.”38 The accounting provisions not only make it more
difficult for companies to hide corrupt payments, but also mean
that when the DOJ files a criminal complaint for violations of
the anti–bribery provisions, the SEC can begin a parallel civil
action, as businesses generally attempt to label bribes
misleadingly in their books and records.39
The wide jurisdictional provisions of the FCPA make it an
important consideration for a variety of companies whose
operations are connected to the United States. The FCPA
applies to real persons, businesses organized under the laws of
the United States, foreign companies that issue U.S.
securities,40 and to any officer director, employee, or agent of
any such company.41 The FCPA’s jurisdiction can even reach
foreign businesses or individuals that merely have bank
accounts in the United States, or that discuss improper
payments at a meeting in the United States.42 These provisions
subject many international companies to FCPA jurisdiction by
way of their connections with the United States.
The last few years have seen an unprecedented increase in
enforcement of the FCPA, which, for many years of its
existence, was not frequently or proactively enforced.43 The
aggressive enforcement environment traces back to 2007, when
the number of DOJ enforcement actions jumped up to nineteen
from the previous year’s seven enforcement actions.44 In fiscal
year 2010, the DOJ imposed one billion dollars in FCPA
penalties — the largest in the FCPA’s history.45 The DOJ has

12.

38. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000); Koehler, supra note 17, at 411–

40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a)(1) (1998).
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd–1(a) (1998).
42. Obiamaka P. Madubuko, Emerging Markets: Risky Business or Golden
Opportunities?, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT COMPLIANCE ISSUES 79,
available at 2010 WL 2828304 (July 2010).
43. Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police: What’s Behind the
New Boom in FCPA Enforcement Activity?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, May
2010, at 14, 15 (“Enforcement actions were rare until about four years ago, but
the numbers have exploded since then: 40 cases filed last year, compared to 12
in 2005. . . .”).
44. FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions Chronological List 2007, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE
FRAUD
DIVISION,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2007.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2012).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 11–085,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECURED MORE THAN $2 BILLION IN JUDGMENTS
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also substantially increased aggressive enforcement tactics that
were rarely used in the past, including criminal prosecutions
against individual executives.46 The DOJ shows no signs of
relenting, with FCPA enforcement continuing to be a top
agency priority.47
One notable feature of the FCPA relevant to the following
analysis is the absence of widely available affirmative defenses.
The FCPA has no affirmative corporate “compliance” defense,
like that found in the British Bribery Act discussed below, for
corporations that have strong programs intended to prevent
bribery.48 The two affirmative defenses and “exception” that the
FCPA does contain are rarely used — leading critics to call
them “meaningless for FCPA defendants,”49 and “useless,”50 a
criticism that even defenders of the FCPA essentially concede.51
The first FCPA affirmative defense says that otherwise
prohibited payments are not illegal if the transfer was “lawful
under the written laws and regulations of the
foreign . . . country.”52 This defense does little to help
defendants.53 Even countries where corruption is an accepted
and normal practice do not explicitly condone it in written
laws.54 The second FCPA affirmative defense says no violation
AND SETTLEMENTS AS A
CRIMINAL
DIVISION

RESULT OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS LEAD BY THE
(Jan.
21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-crm-085.html.
46. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing
Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Greg Andres, Acting Deputy Assistant,
Att’y
Gen.
of
the
United
States),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44435824/Prepared-Statement-of-Greg-AndresDOJ-Senate-Hearing-Examining-Enforcement-of-the-FCPA-Nov-30-2010.
47. Bruce Carton, The Summer of FCPA, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jun. 14,
2011, http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/the-summerof-fcpa/article/204856/.
48. Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative
Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global
Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 399–400 (2011).
49. Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative
Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464, 464
(2010).
50. Id. at 466
51. Thomas, supra note 7, at 447 (“This second affirmative defense has
been increasingly invoked by defendants, though not necessarily with any
measure of success. Defendants do not seem to invoke the ‘lawful under the
laws’ defense commonly.”).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(c)(1), –2(c)(1), –3(c)(1) (1998).
53. Sheahen, supra note 49, at 472–74.
54. Id. at 470.
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occurs when a payment is made for a “reasonable” and “bona
fide expenditure” that was directly related to the “promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services or the
execution or performance of a contract with a foreign
government or agency thereof.”55 While some defendants do try
to invoke this defense, the DOJ has a very strong track record
arguing against such claims.56 Finally, the FCPA does not
apply to “facilitation payments” made to speed up routine
governmental action,57 but this exception has been read very
narrowly by courts. In effect, it does not even apply to the
majority of international business transactions that implicate
the FCPA.58
Another notable feature of the FCPA, which is especially
interesting in light of the following analysis of the Bribery Act,
is that the FCPA only prohibits the bribery of public–sector
recipients. Another U.S. law, the Travel Act, broadly prohibits
the use of “interstate or foreign commerce or any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent to . . . promote,
manage, establish, carry on or facilitate the promotion,
management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful
activity”59 found on a list of state–law crimes that includes
bribery.60 Though the Travel Act was originally intended as a
tool to fight organized crime in the United States, the DOJ has
begun to use it to supplement FCPA prosecutions and has
argued that the Travel Act can be used as a stand–alone tool to
prosecute companies for private–sector bribery, even in cases
not covered by the FCPA.61 Therefore, even though the FCPA
does not technically prohibit bribery of foreign businesspeople,
the American scheme of anti–corruption legislation does ban
such activities.
55. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 100–418, § 5003(a),
102 Stat. 1107 (amended 1988) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§78dd–1(c)(2), –2(c)(2),
–3(c)(2) (2000)).
56. Sheahen, supra note 49, at 484–86.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(b), –2(b), –3(b) (1998).
58. Harry L. Clark & Jonathan W. Ware, Limits on International
Business in the Petroleum Sector: CFIUS Investment Screening, Economic
Sanctions, Anti–Bribery, and Other Measures, 6 TEX. J. OIL & ENERGY L. 75,
112 (2010–2011).
59. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (2002).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006).
61. John Hillebrecht & Kiera Gans, FCPA Defense Complicated by Travel
Act,
CORPORATE
SECRETARY
(Oct.
20,
2010),
http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/fcpa/11389/fcpa-defensecomplicated-travel-act/.
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2. THE U.K. BRIBERY ACT OF 2010
In July 2011 the Bribery Act 2010 came into effect,
repealing all of the United Kingdom’s previous statutory and
common law provisions related to bribery,62 and replacing them
with a new broad scheme which, unlike the FCPA, applies to
both the private and public sectors.63 Though the Bribery Act
has been called the “toughest anti–corruption legislation in the
world,”64 it does contain an affirmative defense for compliance.
Like the FCPA, the Bribery Act applies worldwide, and its
jurisdictional provisions are broadly drafted so that any
business with ties to the United Kingdom must consider its
prohibitions when designing its anti–corruption legal
compliance program.65 The Bribery Act bans bribing, being
bribed, bribery of foreign public officials, and failure of
commercial organizations to prevent bribery.66 Individuals
convicted under the Bribery Act can face an uncapped fine as
well as up to ten years in prison, and organizations convicted of
failure to prevent bribery face an uncapped fine.67
The broad jurisdictional scope of some offenses in the
Bribery Act makes it an important part of the regulatory
scheme that American businesses should consider when
formulating an anti–corruption compliance program. For
American companies, the most relevant offense is the “failure of
commercial organizations to prevent bribery,” which can be
prosecuted “irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which
form part of the offense take place in the United Kingdom or
62. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 17 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/17; see also THE CROWN
PROSECUTION SERVICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: JOINT PROSECUTION GUIDANCE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
(Mar.
30,
2011),
available
at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/bribery_act_2010/#a01 (prior regulation of
bribery in the U.K. included the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889
and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906) [hereinafter JOINT
PROSECUTION].
63. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 3 (U.K.),
available at
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
64. Curtis C. Verschoor, U.K. Bribery Act Offers Best Practices for
Preventing
Corruption,
BUSINESS
FINANCE
(Sept.
9,
2011),
http://businessfinancemag.com/article/uk-bribery-act-offers-best-practicespreventing-corruption-0909.
65. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text; JOINT PROSECUTION,
supra note 62, § 3.
66. JOINT PROSECUTION, supra note 62, § 3.
67. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 11 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
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elsewhere.”68 The Act applies these provisions to organizations
incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom,
or any foreign company that “carries on a business, or part of a
business, in any part of the United Kingdom.”69 The Bribery
Act does not define the vague “carries on a business” language
and British Ministry of Justice (MOJ) commentary has not
explained exactly what activities would subject a company to
the Bribery Act’s strictures.70 As a result of the jurisdictional
reach of the Bribery Act, a great number of American
companies with British operations need to revise their FCPA
compliance programs to account for the Bribery Act’s
provisions.71
American companies might also fall within the Bribery
Act’s jurisdictional scope of the offenses of bribery, accepting a
bribe, and bribing of foreign public officials even though the
Bribery Act only grants jurisdiction for these crimes when a
portion of the offense takes place in the United Kingdom or
portions of the offense are committed by individuals with a
“close connection” to the United Kingdom such as citizens,
residents, and businesses organized under British law.72
Therefore, even some companies with no British operations
may be subject to the Bribery Act’s wide jurisdictional reach.
Importantly, the Bribery Act criminalizes the failure of
commercial organizations to prevent bribery.73 The Bribery Act
68. Id. §§ 7(7), 12(6).
69. Id. § 7(5)(b).
70. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: CIRCULAR 2011/05 para. 22
(June
27,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/circulars/bribery-act-2010circular-2011-5.pdf (explaining that the phrase “carries on a business” should
be interpreted with a “common sense approach”).
71. The MOJ has not clarified exactly what British business presence will
leave a company subject to the Bribery Act, but they have said that having
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange or owning a British subsidiary
will not make a company subject to the act. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE
BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ABOUT PROCEDURES WHICH RELEVANT
COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT PERSONS
ASSOCIATED WITH THEM FROM BRIBING para. 36 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/briberyact-2010-guidance.pdf [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
72. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: CIRCULAR 2011/05 para. 9
(June
27,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/circulars/bribery-act-2010circular-2011-5.pdf.
73. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(1) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents (“A relevant commercial
organisation [sic] (“C”) is guilty of an offence [sic] under this section if a person
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states that a business is guilty of an offence if a person
“associated with” a business bribes another person intending to
“obtain or retain business” for the company or to “obtain or
retain an advantage in the conduct of business.”74 The statute
states that a person is culpable only if their actions would make
them guilty of the offense of bribery or bribery of a foreign
official.75 The Ministry has stated that a person or entity is
“associated” with a commercial organization if they “perform
services” for or on behalf of the organization, including
employees, agents, and subsidiaries are included.76 Even
contractors or suppliers can be considered “associated” when
they perform services on behalf of an organization.77
According to the Bribery Act, a person is guilty of bribing
another person if they “promise or give a financial or other
advantage to another person” with the intention to “induce a
person to perform improperly a relevant function or activity,” or
to reward them for the improper performance of such a function
or activity,78 in either the public or the private sector.79 A
person is also guilty of bribing if they give or promise an
advantage to another person, knowing that accepting the
advantage “would itself constitute improper performance of a
relevant function or activity.”80 Similarly, a person is guilty of
accepting a bribe under Section 2 if they request, agree to
receive, or accept a “financial or other advantage”81 when it is
intended that any improper performance follow as a
consequence of the request, when the acceptance of such an
advantage is itself improper, or when the advantage is given as
a reward for improper performance.82 The MOJ has said that
this potentially broad language will not be used to pursue
(“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending– (a) to obtain or retain
business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of
business for C.”).
74. Id.
75. See infra notes 78–87, and accompanying text for discussion of the
elements of these crimes.
76. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 37.
77. Id. at para. 38.
78. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1(2) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
79. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 18.
80. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1(3) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
81. Id. § 2(1–8).
82. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, Explanatory Notes, § 2, para. 22 (U.K.),
available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/notes/division/5/2.
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prosecutions against individuals who give items of value as a
part of a legitimate “public relations exercise designed to
cement good relations.”83 The Bribery Act has a separate
section prohibiting the giving of bribes to a “foreign public
official,” defined as someone who “holds a legislative,
administrative or judicial position of any kind,” or who
exercises a public function for a public agency or public
enterprise in that country.84 Under Section 6, a person is
considered to have bribed if they offer, promise, or give any
financial or other advantage either directly or indirectly85 with
the intention to obtain or retain some sort of business
advantage,86 Unlike the offenses of bribery and accepting a
bribe, no showing of an intended “improper performance” is
required to show bribery of a public official – meaning that, like
the FCPA, the Bribery Act requires businesses to be especially
careful when dealing with foreign government agents.87
For the purpose of this paper, the most notable part of the
Bribery Act is the inclusion of a “compliance defense.” The
Bribery Act includes several different affirmative defenses.
Most fall outside the scope of this paper because they are not
likely to be consistently relevant to American businesses.88
However, the Bribery Act’s provision for a “compliance defense”
economically states: “it is a defense for [a corporation] to prove
that [the corporation] had in place adequate procedures
designed to prevent persons associated with [the corporation]
from undertaking such conduct.”89 Though the Bribery Act
itself does nothing to define “adequate,” it does require the
MOJ to release a compliance guideline.90 Current MOJ
83. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 20.
84. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(5) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
85. Id. § 6(3).
87. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 23.
87. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 23.
88. See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 13 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents
(establishing
an
affirmative defense for bribery conducted in the course of espionage);
GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 48 (indicating the MOJ intends to recognize
the defense of duress).
89. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
90. Section 9 requires the Secretary of State, who heads the Ministry of
Justice, to publish guidance about procedures that commercial organizations
can use to prevent their employees from bribing, and may revise these
procedures “from time to time.” Id. § 9.

CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013))

2013]

FCPA IN BRAZIL

2/21/2013 1:52 PM

261

guidance calls for a program based on six principles:
compliance programs designed to account for the size and
nature of the bribery risk,91 “top–level commitment” within the
company to eliminating bribery,92 periodic documentation of
risk–assessments,93 due diligence research on all associated
persons businesses,94 internal and external communication and
training regarding the organization’s anti–corruption policy,95
and monitoring and reviews based on observed problems to
make changes based on any problems encountered.96
3. BRAZILIAN ANTI–CORRUPTION LAW
Brazil is a signatory to various international anti–
corruption agreements including the Organization for Economic
Co–operation and Development Anti–Bribery Convention,
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the
Organization of American States Inter–American Convention
Against Corruption.97 Brazil has strong anti–corruption laws
which prohibit a wide variety of corrupt acts.98 Though Brazil is
still grappling with serious corruption problems, this recent
legislation has substantially strengthened the fight against
corruption in politics.
Brazil has a substantial historical problem with political
corruption, which was accepted by Brazilians for much of the
20th Century.99 Indeed, supporters of Adhemar de Barros,
governor of São Paulo state during the 1960s, defended him
from accusations of corruption by proclaiming, “He steals, but
he makes things happen,” a saying that became an unofficial

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at paras. 1.1–1.7.
Id. at paras. 2.1–2.4.
Id. at paras. 3.1–3.6.
Id. at paras. 4.1–4.6.
Id. at paras. 5.1–5.8.
Id. at paras. 6.1–6.4.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, UNCAC SIGNATURE
AND
RATIFICATION AS OF 12 JULY 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html;
JOINT
VENTURES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 117 (Darrell Prescott & Salli A.
Swartz eds., 2d ed. 2010).
98. Decreto No. 2.848, de 1940, arts. 332, 333, 337-B, 337-C, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 31.12.1940 (Braz.); Decreto No. 9.613, de 1998, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 4.3.1998 (Braz.).
99. CLÁUDIO WEBER & BRUNO WILHEM SPECK, NATIONAL INTEGRITY
SYSTEMS, COUNTRY STUDY REPORT: BRAZIL 2001 17 (2001), available at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis/nis_reports_by_country.

CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013))

262

2/21/2013 1:52 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 22:1

campaign slogan for de Barros.100 However, Brazil has recently
passed numerous laws that address the issue of political
corruption, including a freedom of information act that requires
disclosure of public spending, and a law that bans politicians
with criminal records from running for office.101 These laws
enjoy widespread public support among voters who oppose
government corruption.102 Furthermore, Projecto de Lei
6826/2010, a bill proposed by the executive in 2010, 103 would
create corporate liability for companies whose agents bribe on a
company’s behalf.104
In keeping with its international treaty obligations to fight
corruption, Brazil has passed laws that prohibit various corrupt
acts. As previously noted, it is important for American
businesspeople to know that civil servants in Brazil are
prohibited from participating in “passive corruption” by
soliciting or accepting any “undue advantage.”105 Brazilian law
also bans “active corruption,” the giving or promising of an
“undue advantage” to a public servant to cause them to make,
omit, or delay any official act.106 Brazil, like the United States,
bans bribes to foreign public officials.107 There are also
prohibitions on various practices connected with bribery
including the “traffic of influence” both within Brazil,108 and in
the context of international business transactions.109 Other
100. Id. at 27 n.40.
101. Stuart Grudgings, Analysis: Brazil’s Rousseff Rides Anti–Graft Wave,
For
Now,
REUTERS,
Nov.
7,
2011,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/07/us-brazil-corruptionidUSTRE7A63G420111107.
102. Id. (noting that an anti–corruption bill passed after 1.5 million
Brazilians signed a petition in support).
103. Câmara dos Deputados do Brasil, Projetos de Leis e Outras Proposições
PL
6826/2010,
(18/12/2010),
available
at
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=46
6400.
104. As of the date of publication the proposal appears as though it may be
stalled in a special committee of the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados. Agência
Câmara de Notícias, Cancelada votação do parecer sobre projeto da Lei
Anticorrupção,
(13/06/2012),
available
at
http://www2.camara.gov.br/agencia/noticias/POLITICA/419795-CANCELADAVOTACAO-DO-PARECER-SOBRE-PROJETO-DA-LEIANTICORRUPCAO.html.
105. Decreto No. 2.848, de 1940, art. 317, DIÁRO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de
31.12.1940 (Braz.).
106. Id. at art. 333.
107. Id. at arts. 337–B, –C.
108. Id. at art. 332.
109. Id. at art. 337–C.
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laws prohibit laundering money gained through political
corruption, and make it illegal to otherwise conceal or disguise
the true nature, origin, location, disposition, movement, or
ownership of assets.110 Although Brazil has had problem
implementing these laws,111 it does have a framework in place
through which to prohibit bribery and has even prosecuted
several domestic politicians.112 The problem is one of
implementation, rather than legislation.113
III. DATA ON CORRUPTION IN BRAZIL
Quality measures of corruption are important for American
lawyers because companies should consider country risks when
formulating their FCPA compliance programs.114 The British
MOJ guidance even explicitly instructs businesses subject to
the Bribery Act to consider “country risk” in formulating a
proportionate compliance program.115 Furthermore, there are
transnational legal NGOs devoted to documenting and
comparing corruption between nations and suggesting policy
changes.116 Lawyers, businesses, and legal NGOs all need
accurate data on corruption or their work may be less effective
110. Decreto No. 9.613, de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO de 4.3.1998
(Braz.).
111. Although Brazil is one of 38 countries that has ratified the OECD
Antibribery Convention, it has been accused of not doing enough to enforce its
anti–bribery laws. See Fritz Heimann & Gillian Dell, Progress Report 2010:
Enforcement of the OECD Anti–Bribery Convention, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
(2010),
available
at
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/oecd_rep
ort_2010.
112. Brazil recently convicted two politicians of corruption charges, though
there are many more that merit prosecution – a problem that the article
suggests will be partially addressed by recent legal changes. Cleaning Up: A
Campaign Against Corruption, ECONOMIST, July 10, 2010, at 36, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16542611.
113. Roger M. Witten et. al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti–
Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS.
LAW. 691, 691 (2009).
114. Roger M. Witten et. al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti–
Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS.
LAW. 691, 691 (2009).
115. GUIDANCE, supra note 71, at para. 25, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/making-reviewing-law/briberyact-2010-guidance.pdf.
116. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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or even counterproductive. This need for accurate information
is problematic because those engaged in corruption endeavor to
conceal their activities. Researchers attempting to generate
cross–country comparisons of corruption have struggled with
the impossibility of directly measuring the activity117 and have
been forced to rely on various proxies for calculating the actual
occurrence of corruption.118 The most popular way to measure
corruption has been to measure perceptions of corruption.119
Data on Brazil indicates that it is perceived to be quite
corrupt,120 but other corruption proxies give researchers reason
to suspect that in the case of Brazil, perception may not
correspond with reality in any substantial way.121
1. PERCEIVED CORRUPTION DATA FOR BRAZIL
The most popular measures of corruption are
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index,
PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide, and the World
Bank’s Governance Indicators Database.122 All these studies
share a common methodology — the use of opinion data to
compare corruption between nations. All of these measures
indicate that Brazil is perceived to be a country with very
corrupt public institutions,123 which is to be expected since the
three measures correlate strongly with each–other.124
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index aggregates third–party polls on public perceptions of the
levels of corruption in different countries.125 According to the
117. Jakob Svensson, Eight Questions about Corruption, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 19, 19–21 (2005).
118. More recent measures have tried to indirectly measure corruption by
measuring its opposite: the strength of a nation’s institutions to prevent
corruption. See Dilyan Donchev & Gergely Ujhelyi, Do Corruption Indices
Measure Corruption? 4 (Mar. 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cjresources.com/CJ_Corrections_pdfs/Do%20Corruption%20Indices%20Measure
%20Corruption%20-%20Dilyan%20et%20al%202007.pdf; Daniel Kaufmann, et
al., Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, DEV. OUTREACH (Dec. 2006),
www.devoutreach.com.
119. Id. at 4.
120. See infra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
121. See Daniel Treisman, What Have We Learned About the Causes of
Corruption from Ten Years of Cross–National Empirical Research?, 10 ANNU.
REV. POL. SCI. 211, 219 (2007).
122. Donchev, supra note 118, at 4.
123. See infra notes 124, 129, 133 and accompanying text.
124. Treisman, supra note 121, at 213.
125. Transparency Int’l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, 4 (2010),
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2010 Global Corruption Report, Brazil has a “serious corruption
problem.”126 It ranked sixty–ninth highest on the Corruption
Perceptions Index among the 178 countries covered by the
report.127 Transparency International has also released a Bribe
Payers Index (BPI), which asks businesspeople about their
perception of the likelihood that foreign firms from various
countries will offer bribes.128 The 2008 BPI ranked Brazil a 7.7
on a scale of zero to ten with higher scores indicating lower
likelihood of offering bribes abroad.129 This deceptively high
score actually places Brazil in the second most corrupt cluster
of countries discussed in the report.130
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), compiled by
the private research company PRS Group, includes numerical
rankings based on various political, financial, and economic
risks as perceived by the group’s experts.131 One factor in the
ICRG’s assessment of political risk is an assessment of
corruption on a six–point scale with higher scores indicating a
lower risk of corruption.132 This score includes the risk of
demands for special payments or bribes for licenses, tax
assessments and police protection, but focuses on “patronage,
nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor–for–favors’, secret party
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and
business.”133 ICRG data for January 2011 rates Brazil’s
corruption risk at three out of a possible six points,134
indicating that Brazil is perceived to have a serious problem

available
at
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/132/531/2010_CPI_EN.pdf.
126. Countries are scored from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (very clean)
with scores below five considered to indicate a “serious corruption problem.”
Transparency Int’l, Annual Report 2010, 78 (Alice Harrison & Michael Sidwell
eds., 2010).
127. Id.
128. Deborah Hardoon & Finn Heinrich, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Bribe
Payers
Index
2011,
2
(2011),
available
at
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/results/.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id.
131. See ICRG Methodology, International Country Risk Guide, PRS GRP.,
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
132. ICRG Methodology, The Political Risk Rating, PRS GRP.,
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012)
[hereinafter Political Risk Rating].
133. Id.
134. Table 3B: Political Risk Points by Component – Janurary 2011, PRS
GRP., http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/sT3B.xls (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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with corruption in its public institutions.135
The World Bank’s Governance Indicators Database
aggregates various organizational, individual, and expert
survey responses to assign a numerical value to the quality of
countries’ governance.136 One of the governance quality
indicators tracked by the World Bank is control of corruption
which “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites
and private interests.”137 Scores for corruption range from
approximately—2.5 for weak anti–corruption measures to 2.5
for strong government performance against corruption.138 The
2010 Governance Indicators Database gives Brazil a score of
0.056112, which puts Brazil in the fifty–ninth percentile for its
perceptions of effectiveness of anti–corruption measures.139
2. NON–PERCEPTION–BASED INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION IN
BRAZIL
Some researchers have sought to develop alternate
measures for corruption out of concerns that perception may
not be a good proxy for reality.140 One alternative is to study
experiences with corruption, instead of perceptions of
corruption.141 Studies using this approach have found little
correlation between a country’s corruption perception score and
the experience of corruption,142 instead finding the relationship
between perception and experience to be random.143 Studies
135. Political Risk Rating, supra note 132 (noting that getting a score
around half of the total points indicates “very high risk”).
136. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, World Bank,
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 211–14; see also Svensson, supra
note 116, at 207–30; see generally Naci Mocan, Corruption, Corruption
Perception, and Economic Growth, in ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: INSTITUTIONS, CORRUPTION, AND REFORM
38, 38 (Serdar Sayan ed., 2009) (creating aggregate–country level–corruption
index from survey micro data set over 90,000 individuals in 49 countries).
141. Donchev, supra note 118, at 8–10.
142. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 214–17.
143. Claudio Weber Abramo, How Much Do Perceptions of Corruption
Really Tell Us?, 2 ECON.: OPEN–ACCESS, OPEN–ASSESSMENT E–J., Feb. 12,
2008, at 5, http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/20083.
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measuring the experience of corruption in Brazil have found
the experience of corruption to be lower than the perception
statistics would predict. For example, in response to extensive
criticism of its CPI, Transparency International released a
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) that includes a section
asking respondents whether they had personally been expected
to or paid a bribe to a government service provider in the past
year. The 2010 GCB found that only 4% of Brazilians had paid
a bribe, which is a lower percentage of bribe–givers than the
survey found in the United States or any other country in Latin
America.144 Other studies have used the United Nations’
Interregional Crime and Victimization Survey to generate
transnational comparisons of the corruption experience,145 but
these studies have only examined relatively old data for
Brazil,146 and are therefore not included in this analysis.
IV. THE MISUSE OF CORRUPTION STATISTICS BY
AMERICAN LAWYERS MAGNIFIES THE COLLATERAL
DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE FCPA
As noted above, Brazil is widely perceived to be highly
corrupt, but other data sources give researchers reason to
question the validity of that perception. In spite of the conflict
between different measures, perception data is frequently
discussed and disseminated as though it were a measure of
corruption rather than corruption perception — producing
confusion among many consumers of this information.147
Recent scholarship has suggested that corruption perception
data is systematically biased and is not a valid measure for
actual corruption levels.148 This is troubling because many
lawyers are among those who have disregarded the distinction
between perception and reality, and are advising business
clients to use the CPI to gauge comparative corruption risk
between nations.149 This statistical problem implicates a larger
literature critical of the FCPA’s effect on business — and
suggests that the American approach to anti–corruption
144. See, e.g., Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Barometer 2010/11,
http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/results/ (placing Brazil in the same
category as countries that are perceived as having far lower levels of
corruption such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada).
145. See, e.g., Donchev, supra note 118, at 8–10.
146. Id. at 21 tbl.1 (listing ICVS data from 1996, but not from 2000).
147. Abramo, supra note 143, at 3.
148. See infra Part IV.1.
149. See infra Part IV.2.
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enforcement may lead some companies to avoid doing business
in countries that are perceived to be more corrupt than other
corruption metrics suggest.150
1. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING MEASURES FOR
CORRUPTION
Recent research has given scholars good reason to question
the construct validity of corruption perception data as a
measure for actual corruption.151 Though replacing corruption
perception with concrete experience–based measures would
solve some of the more glaring problems with ranking
corruption based on the aggregation of opinions, it is also not
an entirely satisfactory measure for corruption. No existing
measure for corruption is suitable for scaling country risk in
the creation of anti–corruption compliance programs.
Corruption perception data has been criticized as
inconsistent with experiential data.152 Indeed, some authors
assume that concrete experiences of corruption are a more
reliable measure than surveys on how corrupt a group of
American experts consider a country to be.153 These authors
suggest that the low correlation between expert assessments
and experiential data “might be taken as a sign that experts
have a quite coherent set of beliefs about the incidence of
corruption that bears little resemblance to realities on the
ground.”154 Various reasons have been given to prefer
experience based proxies over perception based proxies. Several
of these criticisms are particularly persuasive with regards to
Brazil and other similarly situated developing economies. First,
corruption perception data has been criticized for reflecting a
Western ideological bias among respondents — skewing
perceptions of corruption upwards in countries that are
150. See infra Part IV.3.
151. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 3–5 (discussing generally the various
criticisms of corruption perceptions data).
152. See generally Treisman, supra note 121, at 219.
153. See id. at 217.
154. Daniel Treisman does not endorse the conclusion that the
inconsistency between perceptions and corruption, in itself, indicates that
perceptions data is flawed since this would be subject to the same criticism
legitimately made against those who over–rely on perceptions data; that one
should not blindly assume a proxy is a valid measure for the real thing. See
id.; see, e.g., Abramo, supra note 1143, at 3–4 (“[R]eporting instances of
bribery provides a presumably objective assessment of the actual incidence of
corruption among populations” without justifying the assumption that
experiential statistics provide an unbiased measure of actual corruption).
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culturally different from that of the respondents.155 This gives
an especially strong reason to question the validity of
perception data on Brazil, which is not generally perceived to
be a part of the Western world.156 Second, research has found
that perceptions of corruption are influenced by the total
number of corruption episodes — causing larger countries to be
perceived as more corrupt.157 Because of this, corruption
perception data for Brazil is particularly likely to be inflated in
relation to actual corruption as a percentage of total political
and business activity.158 Third, cultural factors such as
longstanding Protestant traditions, a history of democracy, and
centralized government all distort the perception of corruption
downward with relation to other corruption proxies.159 This
also gives this researcher reason to believe that corruption
perception data is particularly likely to be unreliable in
measuring Brazil’s actual corruption in light of the country’s
strong Catholic, native, and African religious history,160 recent
transition to democracy,161 and federalist system.162 Finally,
some respondents might have longstanding perceptions of a
nation’s corruption that persist regardless of national changes,
which is problematic in Brazil because of its recent transition
from military rule to democracy.163
Other difficulties presented by the use of corruption
perception data include the problem of differing cultural
perceptions, since different definitions and opinions of
“corruption” between countries make perception scores between
155. See Treisman, supra note 121, at 211–15.
156. See DAVID J. HESS & ROBERTO DA MATTA, THE BRAZILIAN PUZZLE:
CULTURE ON THE BORDERLANDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 2 (1995) (“Brazil is
something else, something different from the United States, Canada, and the
societies of Western Europe. It is a country where Western culture has mixed
and mingled with non–Western cultures for centuries.”).
157. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 2.
158. Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business
and Enriches Insiders, FORBES MAGAZINE, May 24, 2010, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruptionbribery-racket.html.
159. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 2.
160. SHAWN BLORE & ALEXANDRA DE VRIES, FROMMER’S BRAZIL 20 (2010)
(noting that the growing number of Protestants in Brazil is a recent
phenomenon).
161. See generally THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE
IN BRAZIL 1964–85 256–303 (1988).
162. DAVID SAMUELS, AMBITION, FEDERALISM, AND LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
IN BRAZIL 79–110 (2003).
163. See Donchev, supra note 118, at 3–5.
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countries impossible to meaningfully compare.164 Historical and
economic factors also influence the perception of corruption,
meaning that corruption perceptions measure many factors
totally unrelated to actual corruption.165 Furthermore, different
levels of sensitivity to corruption among different cultural
groups can result in statistical distortion that paradoxically
makes populations that are more sensitive to and critical of
corruption appear more corrupt.166 Superior anti–corruption
enforcement might also, ironically, increase the perception of
corruption by revealing plots that would not influence
corruption perception if they remained secret.167 Also, the vast
majority of respondents in perception surveys lack direct
experience with corruption in the countries they are asked to
compare, so their responses are often not supported by any
substantial evidence but are instead purely “attitudinal.”168
Cultural variance in the acceptability of criticizing
governments may vary widely, further confounding attempts to
treat corruption perception as an indicator of actual
corruption.169
As a result of these, and other serious methodological and
theoretical problems with corruption perception data, many
scholars, including a former researcher for Transparency
International have admitted that the CPI needs to be radically
revised to be a valid measure for comparative corruption.170 All
this is not to say that corruption perception data is useless, 171
only that it is completely unsuited to transnational
comparisons of actual corruption levels.172 These criticisms of
164. See Marcus J. Kurtz & Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance:
Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 543 (2007).
165. See id.
166. Donchev, supra note 118, at 8.
167. See id. at 2–10.
168. See id. at 4.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Fredrik Galtung, Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and
Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices, in MEASURING CORRUPTION 101, 124
(Charles Sampford et al. eds., 2006).
171. Treisman, supra note 121, at 220 (examining how there is still reason
to study perceived corruption indexes even though they do not measure the
actual frequency of corruption, because for some types of research perceptions
are independently important).
172. Id. at 217–20 (noting that research disputing the construct validity of
corruption perceptions as a measurement for corruption calls into question the
use of perception data as a factor in the award of American development
grants).
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corruption perception data have not deterred the majority of
international investors, development assistance programs, or
academics from relying on the data in their attempts to
evaluate the quality of governance in developing countries.173
Some academics simply assume that “perceptions are
commonly a good indicator of the real level of corruption,” as if
they had compared perception statistics to some independent
estimate of the “real level” of corruption.174 Politicians have
suggested forming government policy, including the
distribution of development aid, based on a preference for
countries perceived to have low levels of corruption.175 As
argued below, one of the worst offenders in the
misinterpretation of corruption perception data is the legal
profession.176
Authors have devised various creative solutions to the
problem of measuring the problem of corruption. One promising
approach is to compare the expert–estimated cost of public
engineering projects with the actual price tag.177
Unfortunately, to date, this methodology has not been applied
to Brazil, or indeed on any kind of scale that would allow it to
be used to compare corruption levels between nations. Another
interesting solution to the problem of measuring corruption has
been to conduct surveys of the international businesspeople
who actually give bribes.178 However, this data is probably
biased by the self–interest of respondents,179 and has been
limited to small geographic regions, limiting its value for cross–
national comparison.180 Another study compares countries to
173. CHRISTINE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, USES AND ABUSES OF
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS Ch. 3 (Org. for Economic Co–operation and Dev.
Ctr. 2006).
174. Abramo, supra note 143, at 3–4.
175. Id. at 4 n.5.
176. See infra Part IV–2 and accompanying text.
177. See Miriam A. Golden & Lucio Picci, Proposal for a New Measure of
Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data, 17 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2005)
(“[Comparing] amounts of physically existing public infrastructures and the
amounts of money cumulatively allocated by government to create these public
works . . . [to identify where] money is being lost to fraud, embezzlement,
waste, and mismanagement . . . .”).
178. See George R.G. Clarke & Lixin Colin Xu, Privatization, Competition,
and Corruption: How Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribes
to Utilities, 88 J. OF PUB. ECON. 2067, 2068 (2004) (combining firm–level data
in twenty–one countries to define characteristics of enterprises that do and do
not pay bribes and identify nation–based characteristics).
179. Kurtz, supra note 164, at 540–48.
180. Donchev, supra note 118, at 3.
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determine where the greatest number of fines have been paid
for violations of the FCPA.181 The authors who produce that
data, though, seem to understand that they have not produced
a measure of corruption because of biases that may influence
the total number of FCPA fines in a given country.182
Studies that replace the proxy of corruption perception
with the proxy of corruption experience reduce problems
related to Western bias and cultural differences Instead of
asking about general perceptions of bribery it measures the
frequency of a concrete event that is interpreted as an
experience with government corruption. However, the
weakness of this approach for anti–corruption compliance is
that it equates petty bribery of police officers and bureaucrats
to high–level corruption among government officials and
businesspeople.183 Though it could be argued that every
different manifestation of corruption experienced by members
of each social strata are all generated by some central core set
of cultural and institutional problems, this hypothesis has not
yet been proved by any of the authors whose studies implicitly
rely upon it.184 Therefore, no existing methodology for the
measurement of corruption is completely satisfactory for the
legal profession’s anti–corruption compliance needs.
2. THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S MISUSE OF CORRUPTION
PERCEPTION DATA
It has been said that “most lawyers went to law school
because they did not like math as a subject.”185 It is therefore
unsurprising that some lawyers overlook the intricacies of the
statistical debate over measuring corruption and instead
endorse the use of perception data for FCPA compliance
purposes. The popularity of corruption perception data in the
181. Where the Bribes Are: Penalties in U.S. Government FCPA Cases Since
1977, JAMES MINTZ GROUP, http://fcpamap.com/ (last viewed Oct. 2, 2012).
182. Joe Palazzolo, Where the Bribes Are, WSJ LAW BLOG (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/16/where-the-bribes-are/ (quoting Jim Mintz,
founder and president of the organization that created the map of FCPA
enforcement, saying the purpose of the map was to create “a stark way of
showing the risks of bribery”).
183. Donchev, supra note 118, at 12.
184. See, e.g., id.
185. Paul J. Lesti, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS § 9:20 (2d ed. 2009); see also
Elie Mystal, Non-Sequiturs: 05.22.12, ABOVE THE LAW (May 22, 2012),
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/05/non-sequiturs-05-22-12/ (“[I]f these judges and
attorneys were good at math, they wouldn’t have gone to law school in the first
place.”).

CAMPBELL - FCPA in Brazil (22 MINN J INTL L 247 (Winter 2013))

2013]

FCPA IN BRAZIL

2/21/2013 1:52 PM

273

legal community is exemplified by a recent Council of Foreign
Relations corporate program meeting where one international
law partner felt the need to give a “shout–out” to Transparency
International for creating the CPI.186 Lawyers advise
businesses subject to the FCPA to consult corruption perception
data without warning them about the distinction between
corruption perception and actual corruption or otherwise
discussing the limitations of the data.187 One international
lawyer and former U.S. Attorney said “Transparency
International’s report is useful in evaluating the playing field
around the world in terms of ethical business practices.”188 A
recent article went so far as to claim that “TI and other web–
based reports by groups and law firms focusing on the FCPA
also assist firms in gauging the extent of the risk of corruption

186. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Dep’t of Justice, International Criminal Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, AntiCorruption, and Beyond, Address at Council on Foreign Relations Corporate
Program
Meeting
(May
4,
2010),
transcript
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/international-law/international-criminal-law-enforcementrule-law-anti-corruption-beyond/p22048.
187. See, e.g., Santiago A. Cueto, 2009 Corruption Perception Index
Released: Can You Guess Where The U.S. Ranked?, INT’L BUS. L. ADVISOR
(Nov.
17,
2009),
http://www.internationalbusinesslawadvisor.com/2009/11/articles/corporategovernance-2/2009-corruption-perception-index-released-can-you-guess-wherethe-us-ranked/; R. CHRISTOPHER COOK & STEPHANIE CONNOR, JONES DAY,
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ENFORCEMENT TRENDS IN 2010 AND
BEYOND
(2010),
available
at
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/f0950ee5-18bb-496f-acfe662b219a108e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ada2352f-00b0-4240-aeef250a23629ba8/FCPA%20Enforcement%20Trends.pdf (including a table of CPI
data in a publication on avoiding FCPA liability without discussion of the
data’s limitations); Christopher T. Marquet, Avoiding the Pitfalls of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, MARQUET INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.marquetinternational.com/pdf/avoiding_the_pitfalls_of_the_fcpa.p
df (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (noting that while Mr. Marquet is not himself a
lawyer he is included in this list because he provides due diligence and
litigation support services and is a non–lawyer member of the Massachusetts
Bar Association). But see GIBSON DUNN, DO RANKINGS MATTER?
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ITS 2010 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
INDEX (Nov. 16, 2010) (acknowledging the possibly misleading nature of
corruption perceptions scores but underscoring the fact that in spite of the
problems with the data the CPI is still the most commonly used measure of
corruption and that businesses compliance evaluators calculate risk
assessments using the CPI).
188. Interview by Global Atlanta with Greenberg Traurig, Former U.S.
Attorney,
Global
Atlanta
(August
19,
2010),
http://www.gtlaw.com/NewsEvents/MediaCoverage?find=138561.
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problems they will encounter doing business abroad.”189 Even
scholars who still favor the limited use of corruption perception
data agree that corruption perception data cannot form a valid
basis for a transnational comparison of actual corruption and
that attempting to do so is a serious misuse of the resource.190
The endemic misuse of corruption perception data in the legal
community underscores the legal profession’s need for a better
tool for evaluating and comparing country corruption
compliance risk. At a minimum, lawyers must understand and
explain the limitations of existing corruption data before
advising clients to use it for FCPA compliance purposes.
3. THE FCPA AS AN “ECONOMIC SANCTION” ON DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION
PERCEPTION DATA
A business leader, discussing anti–corruption regulations,
stated that, “It’s very, very difficult to distinguish between the
potential for corruption (or corruption risk) and actual
corruption.”191 This comment is suggestive of this article’s
thesis: It is hard for business leaders to measure actual
corruption, so their adversity to potentially massive FCPA
liability risk induces them to avoid business in countries that
are seen as corrupt.192 American businesspeople in corrupt
markets are forced to either violate the FCPA and face
potential prosecution or behave ethically and lose business to
Chinese or Russian competitors whose governments do not
punish companies for acts of overseas bribery.193 University of
Chicago–Kent College of Law Professor Andrew Spalding
argues that the FCPA deters American companies from
investing in developing countries, making it essentially
function as an economic sanction.194 This note builds on

189. Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17
INT’L TRADE L.J. 3, 3 (2008).
190. Arndt, supra note 173, at ch. 3.
191. DOW JONES RISK & COMPLIANCE, DOW JONES STATE OF ANTI–
CORRUPTION
COMPLIANCE
SURVEY
9
(2011),
available
at
http://www.dowjones.com/pressroom/SMPRs/DowJonesStateofCorruptionSurv
ey_000.swf.
192. Vardi, supra note 158.
193. Id.
194. See generally, Spalding, supra note 22 (noting that the FCPA deters
desirable investment from countries like the United States in countries where
bribery is perceived to be common).
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Spaulding’s work;195 it finds that the distinction between
corruption perception and reality shows that businesses are not
only deterred from investing in countries that are actually
corrupt —they are also deterred from countries that are merely
perceived to be corrupt. Such analysis supports the addition of
a compliance defense to the FCPA. If the FCPA is indeed to be
understood as an economic sanction, it must be seen as a
particularly irrational sanction because it punishes countries
for simply being perceived as corrupt while reducing
investment in countries that would otherwise be promising
markets for American businesses. This analysis also implies
that Transparency International and legal professionals that
use their data need to do a better job of clarifying the
limitations of the data and encourage the development of new
corruption measures.
Spaulding traces the roots of his theory to a statistical
analysis performed about twenty years after the passage of the
FCPA. This analysis found that when the FCPA took effect,
United States business in countries believed to be corrupt
showed “unusual declines,” and that post–FCPA American
investment grew more rapidly in countries believed to be less
corrupt.196 This study also found that there was no general drop
in international business in these countries believed to be
corrupt, suggesting that when American companies pulled back
because of FCPA fears, they were replaced by “black knights”
— firms from countries that do not punish their own companies
for acts of overseas bribery.197 Spaulding also argues that more
recent empirical work has confirmed the thesis that
anticorruption legislation deters businesses from investing in
countries perceived to be corrupt.198 This statistical observation
has been explained by the fact that some companies see bribery
195. Unlike the legal professionals criticized above for treating the CPI like
a tool that can be used to compare actual corruption, Spaulding always
carefully referred to “perceived corruption” in his work – but he never explored
the potential implications of this distinction for his research. See generally, id.
196. Id. at 372 (citing James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign
Bribery and American Business After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
5266,
1995),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf).
197. Id. at 372, 392 (citing James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment:
Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
5266,
1995),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf).
198. Id. at 371–72 (citing Alvaro Cuervo–Cazurra, Who Cares About
Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 807, 814 (2006)).
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as the cost of doing business in environments that they
perceive to be corrupt, and believe that it may be hard to design
an FCPA compliance program that can guarantee that no
company agents will engage in unapproved acts of
corruption.199 Spaulding suggests that because developing
markets are generally perceived to be more corrupt than
developed ones, the FCPA deters foreign investors from
infusing these economies with needed capital investments.200
Recent surveys of business leaders support the statistical
analysis cited by Spaulding. A survey of 214 executives whose
companies are subject to anti–corruption legislation found that
32% of United Kingdom respondents and 25% of United States
respondents acknowledge that not doing business in corrupt
countries is a way of avoiding the risk for liability in these
areas of the world.201 The 2011 Dow Jones State of Anti–
Corruption Compliance Survey, which surveyed more than 300
companies worldwide, found that more than 55% of companies
delay or avoid working with global business partners due to the
fear of liability of corruption in foreign markets.202
The difference between perception and experience based
corruption data above suggests the FCPA may function not
only as a sanction on actually corrupt countries but also on
countries that are merely perceived to be corrupt. Brazil is
perceived to be far more corrupt than experience based
measures suggest. The existence of countries with mixed
corruption indicators demonstrates that at times, the
distinction between perception and reality may lead some
business leaders to avoid investing because they believe the
FCPA enforcement risk in a given nation to be higher than it
really is. This gives further support to Spaulding’s criticism of
the FCPA because it indicates that if the FCPA should be
viewed as an economic sanction, it needs to be understood as a
poorly aimed sanction that punishes countries based only on
their reputation for corruption instead of any concrete evidence.
The sanction effect hypothesized in this article has
199. Gregory M. Lipper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Elusive
Question of Intent, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1463, 1479 (2010).
200. See, e.g., Spalding, supra note 22, at 373–74.
201. Press Release, KPMG, Majority of U.S. and U.K. Executives Say
Corruption Still Hampers Ability To Expand, Do Business In Some Countries,
(April
7,
2011)
available
at
http://www.kpmg.com/be/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pressreleases/pages/04072011-e.aspx.
202. See COOK, supra note 187, at 2.
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interesting policy implications for Brazilian lawmakers. As
previously noted, “black knights” like China and Russia are
generally thought to fill any gaps left by American businesses
that are too risk–averse to invest in countries perceived to be
corrupt.203 Some Brazilian policymakers might consider it
tempting to let Chinese investors fill the gap left by American
businesses too afraid of FCPA liability to invest in Brazil, but
the undervalued Yuan, a growing trade deficit, and competition
for the manufactured goods market in Latin America, among
other economic issues indicate that if Brazil over–relies on
Chinese investment that it will do so to its own detriment.204 As
a result, Brazilian policymakers should consider the reduction
of the appearance of corruption to be critical in order to
promote economic growth. In Luis Eduardo Suarez’s fictional
but verisimilar book about police in Rio de Janeiro, Elite da
Tropa,205 the Secretary of Public Safety tells a journalist who is
about to publish a story about police corruption: “[T]hat’s life.
Especially public life. It’s not enough to be honest, my friend,
you have to appear honest as well.”206 Brazilian policymakers
should take the fictional Secretary’s words to heart, and pass
tough anti–corruption laws in an attempt to re–adjust
international corruption risk perceptions. Advanced legal
systems with relatively low levels of perceived corruption
consider the reduction of the appearance of corruption to be an
important policy goal.207 This research suggests that Brazilian
policymakers should do more to reduce the appearance of
corruption to supplement their existing fight against actual
corruption.
The sanction hypothesis advanced in this article has the
203. See Spalding, supra note 22, at 397.
204. CARLOS PEREIRA & JOÃO AUGUSTO DE CASTRO NEVES, FOREIGN
POLICY AT BROOKINGS, POLICY PAPER NO. 26, BRAZIL AND CHINA: SOUTH–
SOUTH PARTNERSHIP OR NORTH–SOUTH COMPETITION? 3–7 (March 2011),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/03%20brazil%2
0china%20pereira/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf.
205. Peter Sciretta, ‘Elite Squad 2’ is a Must See Crime Thriller [Sundance
Review], SLASH FILM, (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.slashfilm.com/elite-squad-2sundance-review/ (describing Elite Squad: The Enemy Within, as “a cross
between The Departed, The Wire, and The Godfather.”).
206. LUIZ EDUARDO SOARES ET AL., ELITE SQUAD 289 (Clifford E. Landers
trans., 2008).
207. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 638 (1976) (“Of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the
impact of the appearance of corruption . . . .”).
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greatest implications for lawmakers in the United States, given
the growing importance that countries like Brazil have to the
world economy. Brazilians have long repeated the mantra that
Brazil is the country of the future, because its vast territory,208
large population,209 and an ample supply of natural resources210
give it a staggering economic potential. In recent years it has
become cliché for commentators discussing Brazil to claim that
the future has arrived.211 Even in the context of the country’s
relatively slow growth in 2012,212 these claims do not seem out
of place given Brazil’s recent advances,213 discovery of massive
offshore oil fields,214 and the revenues expected when Brazil
hosts the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in
2016.215 Though some commentators have urged restraint in

208. WERNER BAER, THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT 5 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that Brazil has the fifth largest land
mass of any county in the world, making up 47% of South America).
209. Brazil’s population of more than 200 million inhabitants is the fifth
largest in the world. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK:
BRAZIL (2011); see also, BAER, supra note 208, at 7; see, e.g., Charles W.
Cookson II, Long–Term Direct Investment in Brazil, 35 U. MIAMI INTER–AM L.
REV. 345, 347–48 (2004) (arguing that Brazil’s large consumer market makes
it an attractive market for foreign investment).
210. BAER, supra note 208, at 3–6 (noting that Brazil has long been an
agricultural powerhouse and had a strong mining industry); see also, Matt
Moffett, Brazil Joins Font Rank of New Economic Powers, WALL ST. J., May
13,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121063846832986909.html.
211. See, e.g., Tom Phillips, The Country of the Future Finally Arrives, THE
GUARDIAN,
May
9,
2008,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/10/brazil.oil; Jeffry Simpson, The
Country of the Future May Finally be Arriving, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 22,
2010,
available
at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/thecountry-of-the-future-may-finally-be-arriving/article1477427/.
212. Brian Winter and Silvio Cascione, Update 3–Brazil Economic Recovery
in Doubt After Weak 2nd Qtr, Reuters (Aug. 31, 2012) http://www.reuters.co
m/article/2012/08/31/brazil-economy-idUSL2E8JV1ZM20120831.
213. Luciana Lopez & Silvio Cascione, Brazil Economy Surges in 2010;
Growth
Seen
Cooling,
REUTERS
(Mar.
3,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/us-brazil-economyidUSTRE7222QZ20110303.
214. Simon Romero, New Fields May Propel Americas to Top of Oil
Companies’ Lists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/world/americas/recent-discoveries-putamericas-back-in-oil-companies-sights.html.
215. David Robinson, Brazil: Special Report: Growth and Opportunity, THE
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the evaluation of emerging markets such as Brazil,216 even
cautious and skeptical analysis suggest a positive outlook for
Brazil’s economy.217 Furthermore, the Goldman Sachs report
cited above indicates that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) are considered to have sufficient growth
potential to overtake more mature economies in the coming
decades.218 The Goldman analysts argue that new economic
realities are being created by the rise of the BRICs and that
governments and firms in the developed world ought to take
note and invest accordingly.219 According to this note, the
FCPA actually creates fear of investing in these developing
countries. This is particularly harmful to the United States
because it denies important investment opportunities for
American businesses. If, as the Goldman report suggests,
American investors need to pursue opportunities in the BRICs
— then American government policy should reflect that need
by eliminating artificial barriers between its businesses and
best new prospects for increased profits. While American
business is certainly seeing growth in Brazil, my research may
suggest that existing investment levels are lower than they
would be without the unnecessary fear induced by FCPA
concerns.
Ultimately, this refinement of the sanction thesis bolsters
suggestions that the FCPA should be amended to contain an
affirmative defense for companies that make a good–faith
216. See, e.g., Some Like It Hot, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 20, 2011, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18895150.
217. Andre Soliani & Matthew Bristow, Brazil, India, China May Be
Overheating As Bubbles Emerge, Roubini Says, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-31/roubini-says-brazil-india-chinamay-be-overheating-sees-asset-bubbles.html (quoting Nouriel Roubini, the
New York University professor who predicted the global financial crisis as
saying that in spite of signs of overheating and possible asset bubbles the
outlook for Brazil is “very positive”).
218. DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, PAPER NO: 99,
DREAMING WITH THE BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050, GLOBAL ECONOMICS
(Goldman
Sachs
2003),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/ourthinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2012) (“The size of Brazil’s economy overtakes Italy by 2025; France by 2031;
UK and Germany by 2036.”).
219. Id. (“As the advanced economies become a shrinking part of the world
economy . . . [b]eing invested in and involve in the right markets—and
particularly the right emerging markets—may become an increasingly
important strategic choice for many firms.”); see also, The New Champions:
Emerging Markets are Producing Examples of Capitalism at its Best, THE
ECONOMIST,
Sept.
18,
2008,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/12080711 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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attempt to comply with the law. A compliance based
affirmative defense does not completely eliminate the market
distortion created by anti–corruption legislation because
companies doing business in countries believed to be corrupt
still need to invest more money into compliance programs than
businesses in developed nations.220 However, the cost of an
anti–corruption compliance program is far lower than the harm
sustained by an FCPA enforcement action.221 Even if a
compliance defense would not completely solve the sanction
problem, it would at least minimize the market distortion
created by a law that is meant to deter bribery but in its
present form actually deters investment. A compliance defense
does not solve the sanction problem, but it certainly
ameliorates the issue for developing countries that are
perceived to be corrupt.
This research also has important implications for
transnational NGOs, such as Transparency International,
which should do a better job explaining the limitations of
perception–based data and highlight some alternative
corruption measures to encourage further research. This note
suggests that, at a minimum, American lawyers need to stop
advising clients to calibrate anti–corruption compliance
programs based on perception data and communicate more of
the limitations of perception data to clients engaging in FCPA
compliance risk calculations.
V. CONCLUSION
The last few years were the first time in history that a
country meaningfully threatened its own businesspeople with
criminal liability for overseas bribery. The United States was
the first major power to take such a step, and the legislation it
produced was historic but flawed. The absence of an affirmative
defense for compliance and the impossibility of implementing a
perfectly effective anti–corruption program have made it very
important for companies to accurately predict which regions,
countries, or industries will create the greatest temptations for
220. See supra Part II–2 (noting that anti–corruption compliance programs
should be proportional to the risk encountered in the business environment).
221. Leslie McCarthy, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, SETTING THE
FCPA COMPLIANCE STANDARD: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR AN EFFECTIVE
GLOBAL THIRD–PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PROGRAM (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/2009/whitepaper-fcpacompliance-standards-global-third-party-due-diligence-program/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2012).
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their agents to engage in bribery. Unfortunately it is impossible
to accurately measure corruption itself, and the most popular
proxy to date is the aggregation of a number of surveys of
opinions. The aggregation of opinion is still nothing more than
opinion — and in this case there is little observed
correspondence between perception and reality. In spite of
these flaws some members of the legal profession have
wholeheartedly endorsed the use of perception data for anti–
corruption compliance, which is problematic since existing data
suggests that some companies completely avoid countries that
they perceive to be an anti–corruption compliance risk.
Non–perception based data suggests that Brazil may be a
country where there is a particularly wide disjuncture between
perception and reality on the issue of corruption. Essentially,
this means that Brazil might be the innocent bystander struck
by the crossfire between the United States and foreign
corruption. However, it also means that the United States
could be hurting itself because it is creating a disincentive for
its own businesses to invest in highly promising markets. The
addition of a compliance defense to the FCPA is desirable, since
it would alleviate both problems. Until American lawmakers
follow the British lead and make good–faith attempts to comply
with the law an affirmative defense to FCPA charges, the legal
profession needs to do a better job of explaining the limits of
statistical measures of corruption to clients calibrating their
global compliance programs.

